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The allocation of permits is an important design aspect of an emissions trading
scheme. Traditionally, governments have favoured the free allocation of greenhouse
gas permits based on individual historical emissions (‘grandfathering’) or industry
benchmark data. Particularly in the European Union (EU), the free allocation of
permits has proven complex and ineﬃcient and the distributional implications are
politically diﬃcult to justify; auctioning emissions permits has therefore become more
popular. The EU is now moving to auction more than 50 per cent of all permits in
2013, and in the US the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) has begun
auctioning more than 90 per cent of total allowances. Another case in point is the
Australian proposal for a Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS), which
provides for auctioning a signiﬁcant share of total permits. This paper discusses the
proposed Australian CPRS’s auction design. A major diﬀerence to other emissions
trading schemes is that the CPRS plans to auction multiple vintages of emissions
permits simultaneously.
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1. Introduction
Over the last few years, political interest in auctioning emissions permits has
grown. The traditional free allocation process is plagued by windfall gains to
emitters, as reﬂected in the EU experience (Sijm et al. 2006), and the inevita-
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Economics Societybly contentious debate about who should get the permits. Most notably, envi-
ronmentalists have criticised the free allocation of permits as a transfer from
the public to the emitting companies, contending that these transfers increase
with the size of the company’s past and/or expected future emissions. From a
social perspective, consumer protection agencies have argued that consumers
are unfairly burdened with the (opportunity) costs of emissions permits,
which are factored into the power companies’ tariﬀ calculation even if the
permits were allocated for free.
1
Besides the political arguments related to distributional impacts, there are
good economic reasons for auctioning emissions permits (Cramton and Kerr
2002). First of all, any administrative allocation procedure is likely to be
ineﬃcient, at least temporally before secondary market trading occurs, as it
cannot guarantee that it will allot the permits to those who value them most,
i.e. those with highest abatement costs. Second, an auction – if appropriately
designed – can serve as a mechanism to elicit the market value of an item. This
aspect is particularly important in an emissions trading scheme, because many
abatement measures require long-term planning and need years before they
become eﬀective. The early price signals generated by a well-designed auction
reﬂect the economy’s marginal costs of greenhouse gas abatement and thus
help the decision-makers to identify which measures are economically eﬃ-
cient. Third, auctioning emissions permits generates public revenues that are
less disruptive of economic eﬃciency than taxes on proﬁts or income.
2 More-
over, these proceeds partly oﬀset the aforementioned shift from the consumer
to producer surplus and can be used to counter regressive impacts.
3
This study provides a comprehensive review and discussion of the Austra-
lian Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme’s (CPRS) auction design. It draws
on lessons from auction theory and experiments as well as the authors’ experi-
ence with practical applications of large-scale auctions. The paper also
explains the particularities of the Australian emissions trading scheme with
regard to auctions and summarises the auction proposal of the CPRS as laid
out in the White Paper (Commonwealth of Australia 2008). Section 2 gives
an overview of the CPRS design elements relevant for the auction; Section 3
discusses the relevant theoretical, experimental and empirical literature. In
Section 4 the goals of the auction are presented, while Section 5 outlines the
1 The German federal consumer association (Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband) claimed,
for example, that power generators abused the trading of emissions permits for windfall gains
at the expense of the consumers (Deutsches Verba ¨ ndeforum, 2005).
2 Using the auction revenue to reduce other distortional taxes such as income tax is similar
to the ‘double dividend’ discussion in relation to environmental tax revenues, which would
improve the overall eﬃciency of the economy (Goulder 1995).
3 Betz and Neuhoﬀ (2008) have argued that low-income households bear a larger relative
burden of a cap on emissions than high-income households because they spend a higher share
of their income on emissions intensive goods such as electricity. Furthermore, low-income
households do not beneﬁt as much from the higher share values occasioned by the free alloca-
tion of permits because shareholders are mainly high-income households, and the regressive
eﬀect is thereby reinforced.
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assesses the interaction of primary and secondary markets; Section 7 con-
cludes the paper.
2. Background on the proposed Australian emissions trading scheme
The CPRS legislation was introduced twice into the Australian parliament
in 2009, but remains unpassed at the time of this writing. The legislation
does not describe the auction procedure in depth and gives few details
about the auction design itself. The most comprehensive information on
the planned auction design is outlined in the White Paper (Commonwealth
of Australia 2008). The main features of the CPRS based on the CPRS
Draft Legislation (Australian Government 2009) can be summarised as fol-
lows:
• The CPRS is supposed to cover around 70 per cent of Australia’s green-
house gas emissions, which will include a wide range of emitting sources
(e.g. from the electricity industry to the transport sector); some of them
will be covered downstream, some upstream.
4
• The scheme is scheduled to start on 1 July 2011.
• In the ﬁrst year (2011–12), permits can be acquired at a ﬁxed price of $10/t
CO2 equivalent.
5 There will be no cap on permits and permits cannot be
carried over to future periods, i.e. banking will not be allowed (Australian
Government 2009).
• Full trading will start in 2012–13. Permits from 2012 to 2013 onwards –
so-called Australian Emissions Units, (AEU) – will be date-stamped
(vintages) and bankable. In other words, if an AEU is not being used for
compliance in a given year, it can be banked for the future without restric-
tions; moreover, a small share of borrowing is foreseen (5 per cent of
future vintages can be used before they become valid).
• For the ﬁrst 4 years of the trading scheme (2012–13 to 2015–16), a price
cap will be introduced. This cap will start at $40 and increase each year at
a real rate of 5 per cent. The future shape of the permit price cap will be
discussed at the ﬁrst independent review.
6
• Some permits will be allocated for free to so-called ‘strongly aﬀected’
industries (e.g. coal-ﬁred electricity generators) as well as Emissions-
Intensive and Trade-Exposed (EITE) Industries; EITE are to receive free
allocations based on output data multiplied by a benchmark.
7
4 A downstream approach requires fossil fuel users to acquire emission allowances, whereas
an upstream approach requires permits to be acquired by the fuel producers.
5 In this paper, unless speciﬁed otherwise, all dollars refer to Australian dollars.
6 The impact of the price cap on eﬃciency, eﬀectiveness and fairness is discussed in Jotzo
and Betz (2009).
7 For details on allocation rules for EITE industries, see the White Paper and accompanying
documents: http://www.climatechange.gov.au.
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advance auction of this vintage is scheduled to be held before the start of
the scheme. We estimate that the auction share will be more than half of
the AEUs of any given vintage. The share may ﬂuctuate over time with
changes in the output of EITE sectors or in case the coverage is extended.
8
• Permits have to be surrendered on the basis of annual monitoring and
reporting.
• One-sided international linkages to include other eligible international
units (as stipulated in part 1, Section 5, p. 11 of the CPRS Bill 2009) will
be made possible, such as the unlimited use of the Clean Development
Mechanism and Joint Implementation. The export of AEUs, however,
will not be allowed.
As in the EU, an AEU allows its owner to emit one tonne of CO2 equiva-
lent. Whereas a European Union Allowance is valid for a given compliance
period (e.g. 5 years for Phase II, 8 years for Phase III), Australia plans to
have a ﬁner granularity. As indicated before, each AEU will have a date
stamp (vintage) indicating the year in which it will become valid. (For exam-
ple, an AEU with a vintage of 2014/15 will only become valid from July 2014
onwards and cannot be used for compliance in the ﬁrst 2 years of the CPRS,
i.e. 2012/13 and 2013/14). Inter-temporal ﬂexibility is limited to the possibility
of unrestricted banking (e.g. any surplus of AEUs can be carried over to
future periods to be used for compliance) and some limited share of borrow-
ing (e.g. 5 per cent of 2014/15 vintages can be used for compliance in the year
2013/14).
Thus, emissions permits of diﬀerent vintages are interchangeable in certain
circumstances: A permit of an earlier vintage can always substitute for a per-
mit of a later vintage. The reverse is not true: only up to 5 per cent of a year’s
emissions can be covered by permits of a future year. Two permits of the
same vintage are always perfect substitutes, of course.
With respect to production technologies and long-term abatement mea-
sures, 1 year is a rather short time frame. As far as investments in eﬃciency
improvements are concerned, companies would like to have some indication
of the value of a future permit, possibly years in advance. A natural approach
is to allocate permits that are subject to long-term emissions management
approximately concurrently with the investment decisions. The allocation of
permits that concern short-term ﬂuctuations (e.g. in energy consumption)
however, could occur later. This suggests that it does not make sense to allo-
8 There is no auction share published in the White Paper and data for EITE industries are
not available on the disaggregated level, so it is not possible to actually calculate the amount of
the free allocation. We therefore used the free allocation share of 25 per cent cited in the White
Paper for EITE industries and the published number of free permits to strongly aﬀected indus-
tries (which was converted to around 6 per cent). This results in an auction share of around 70
per cent. However, according to the announced changes in 2009, such as the Global Recession
Buﬀers, a longer allocation of free permits to strongly aﬀected industries (10 instead of 5 years)
will reduce this amount.
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follows that at a particular point in time permits of diﬀerent vintages might
be allocated simultaneously. An appropriate auction design should take this
latter aspect into consideration and provide some ﬂexibility. For example, if a
bidder seeks to acquire permits of a particular vintage, but an earlier vintage
is available for less, he should be allowed to buy the earlier vintage because it
serves the same purpose (this can be diﬃcult to arrange if auctions are held
sequentially and/or are sealed, however). Moreover, the auction should gen-
erate a price structure that yields valuable information with respect to the
expected scarcity of permits in the future.
3. Related literature
The early literature on tradable permit systems (e.g. Dales 1968) typically
assumed that permits were sold to the polluters. Some years later, Montgom-
ery (1972) showed that the outcome (equilibrium price) is not impacted
whether permits are auctioned or freely allocated. His ﬁnding, combined with
the political diﬃculties in achieving acceptance for auctioning, might explain
why auctions have rarely been used in actual environmental markets. Esta-
blished schemes that did apply auctions, such as the Acid Rain program or
the NOx trading system in the US, auctioned only a small share of the total
allowances (e.g. Cason and Plott 1996; see also Evans and Peck 2007). There-
fore, the empirical literature in fact provides very little empirical information
on permit auctions.
Within the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), the auction share was
limited up to 5 per cent in Phase I (2005–7) (CEC 2003). Only four EU mem-
bers (Denmark, Hungary, Ireland and Lithuania) decided to auction oﬀ parts
of their ET budget – a total of only 4.4 mio. t of CO2e per year, or 0.2 per cent
of the entire ET budget in the ﬁrst phase (Betz et al. 2006). In Phase II
(2008–12), the auction share was limited by the Directive (CEC 2003) to go
up to 10 per cent. Only six of the 27 European Union Member States have
chosen to auction allowances in this phase.
9 Up to now, the dominant auction
format in the EU has been the uniform-price sealed-bid auction, whereby all
auctions have set a minimum price and succeeded in generating prices around
the secondary market price.
10 In Phase III, the adopted Directive (CEC 2009)
foresees a much higher share of auctioning. Auctions will be the dominant
9 Total amount to be sold or auctioned is around 3% of EU-budget 2008-2012. The follow-
ing countries are auctioning or selling allowances (based on National Allocation Plan data):
Germany (9% or 40.0 Mio. EUA/a around 60% of total auctioning amount of EU), UK (7%
or 17.2 Mio. EUA/a), Netherlands (3.7% or 3.2 Mio. EUA/a), Lithuania (2.8% or 0.5 Mio.
EUA/a), Hungary (2.7% or 0.5 Mio. EUA/a), Austria (1.3% or 0.4 Mio. EUA/a). Two coun-
tries are selling: Ireland (0.5% or 0.1 Mio. EUA/a) and Denmark (0.3% or 0.1 Mio. EUA/a).
10 Fazekas (2008) has reported that most countries (apart from Ireland) started auctioning
‘too late’, i.e. they auctioned only after the drop of permit prices in May 2006 and therefore
missed out on the earlier high prices.
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other sectors as free allocation is gradually phased out by 2027 (with the
exception of free allocations to sectors with a risk of leakage).
11 However, as
the EU ETS is based on phases and not on vintages, and already has a liquid
market, the auction design may diﬀer from that of the CPRS. For example,
the current design in the UK for Phase II is a uniform-price sealed-bid
auction.
The only emissions trading scheme with a substantial share of auctioning
(more than 90 per cent) is the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) in
the US. It also employs uniform-price sealed-bid auctions. Again, the units
diﬀer from those of the CPRS in that they have compliance periods of
3–4 years. In the RGGI, auctions were initiated in September 2008. Current
vintages are auctioned along with one future vintage from the next compli-
ance period (RGGI 2008). The total share one participant can bid for is
capped at 25 per cent of total permits and 100 per cent ﬁnancial insurance is
required for all bids. The auctions are held separately, bids are handed in
sequentially, and the results of the auctions are revealed only after both of
them have been closed. The experience of the ﬁrst four auctions has shown
that the auction price was usually a better predictor of the underlying market
trend than other secondary market prices. The auctions have generally been
competitive (with around 45 bidders in the current vintage and around 12
bidders in the future vintage).
12
So far, the empirical literature on permit auctions has not yet reported on
experience with simultaneous clock auctions. We will therefore move on to
review the theoretical and experimental literature.
There is a rich body of literature on multi-item and multi-unit auctions,
both theoretical and experimental. The theoretical analysis of auctions is
rather straightforward if we restrict our attention to bidders with a demand
of only one item (or one unit). In this case many of the results known from
single-item auctions still hold. Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998), for
example, illustrate the fundamental changes that occur if one allows for bid-
ders who have a demand of up to two units. A more general analysis of multi-
unit demand of homogeneous items is provided by Ausubel and Cramton
(2002). The general theme of this literature stream is that in a multi-unit
demand scenario bidders tend to bid rather defensively compared to their
(marginal) valuations. As a result, the outcome of multi-unit auctions can
well be ineﬃcient.
A further generalisation can be drawn from auctions of multiple hetero-
geneous items. A rigorous analysis is given e.g. in Armstrong (2000). The
assumptions of the underlying economic situation are very basic, however, as
11 Emissions leakage can occur when there is an increase in GHG emissions in a country
without climate policies as a result of any decreases in production associated with the domestic
climate policies of another country.
12 This information is based on a presentation by Bill Shobe at the Centre for Energy and
Environmental Markets, UNSW in October 2009.
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situations in which the valuations of the items put up for auction are charac-
terised by interdependencies, either complementarities (a bundle of items is
worth more than the total value of the individual items) or substitutability
(a bundle is worth less than the sum of the values of its individual items).
Bidding now becomes more complex, and additional diﬃculties, such as the
exposure problem, may arise. The literature focuses on bundle bids and
eﬃciency, often benchmarking possible auction formats with the
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, an extension of the Vickrey
auction (Vickrey 1961) for multi-item situations. For combinatorial reasons,
however, bidding in a VCG auction is diﬃcult and even infeasible if there are
a large number of items. For an overview of combinatorial auctions, see
Cramton et al. (2006).
Most of the papers described above investigate auctions in which the bid-
ders have private valuations of the objects, i.e. know exactly how much a par-
ticular item or a bundle of items is worth to them. This assumption may not
hold in the context of greenhouse gas permits, though, because bidders face
uncertainties about the development of abatement technologies, future
demand for their products, or the future prices of alternative fuels.
13 When it
comes to multi-unit demand with uncertain valuations, the theory is much
less developed (see e.g. Ausubel 1999), but there is virtually nothing in the
literature on auctions in which diﬀerent types of items (e.g. diﬀerent vintages
in the emissions permits context) and many units (AEUs) are involved. Thus,
a theoretical approach to the problem at hand does not seem feasible.
Similarly, the experimental literature does not speciﬁcally address auctions
that bring together all of the important features related to the AEU auction.
This is especially true with respect to the multi-unit and multi-item aspects.
Manelli et al. (2006) experimentally compare the static Vickrey auction with
a dynamic variant (Ausubel 2006). The experiment is interesting insofar as it
involves common-value components. However, each bidder has identical val-
ues for up to only two units and values a third unit at zero. Heterogeneous
items are not considered.
Porter et al. (2009) is one of the only experimental works to address the
interaction between multi-unit and multi-item aspects of diﬀerent auction
types.
14 They experimentally compare clock auctions and a sealed-bid auction
in both a simultaneous and sequential setting in which multiple units of two
diﬀerent items are oﬀered. Moreover, the context is very similar to the AEU
auction in that Porter et al. investigate potential designs for the Virginia NOx
auction with two (bankable) vintages. They ﬁnd that the simultaneous
clock auction has desirable eﬃciency properties and outperforms alternative
13 The diﬀerence between the prices of coal and gas, for example, is a major driver of the
price of an emissions permit, as a fuel switch from coal to gas is an important abatement mea-
sure.
14 Holt et al. (2007) have conducted many experiments to test the auction design for the
RGGI scheme. However, auctioning diﬀerent vintages (multi-items) was not tested.
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proposed CPRS auction design.
More recently, Ausubel et al. (2009) have experimentally tested sealed-bid
and clock auctions in a setting where bidders had additional side constraints,
such as budget limitations or liquidity needs. Their ﬁndings also support the
proposed CPRS auction design.
To conclude, none of the existing literature (empirical, theoretical and
experimental) explicitly addresses simultaneous auctions of multiple permit
vintages, which is an important feature of the proposed Australian CPRS
auctions.
4. Goals of the auctions
With respect to the goals of the auction, the Australian Government’s (2008)
CPRS White Paper states (Commonwealth of Australia 2008, p. 9-2): ‘The
Government considers that the key objectives are as follows:
• Promote allocative eﬃciency (…) with a minimum of risk and transaction
costs.
• Promote eﬃcient price discovery. (…)
• Raise auction revenue (consistent with other objectives). (…)’
The primary objective is to ensure that permits are allocated eﬃciently,
meaning that they ﬂow to the bidders who value them the most. Minimising
risk (e.g. market power or collusion) and transaction costs are part of this
objective. As mentioned in this paper’s introduction, the main advantage of
running auctions is that the resulting allocation is likely to be more eﬃcient
than any other administrative allocation mechanism. However, even if an
auction is used, achieving eﬃciency is a challenge in a multi-unit context. In
most formats (e.g. pay-your-bid and uniform auctions), bidders will shade
their bids, i.e. the bids will understate the true marginal valuations. Particu-
larly if bidders are non-symmetric, some degree of ineﬃciency is likely. Other
formats, like VCG approaches, oﬀer eﬃcient outcomes – at least in a private
value context – but are diﬃcult to implement and challenging to communi-
cate to participants.
By generating price signals, auctions address the second objective, which is
to promote eﬃcient price discovery. A well-designed auction mechanism
aggregates the beliefs of all participants regarding the value of the permits.
This reduces planning uncertainty and provides valuable information to deci-
sion-makers concerning investments in abatement measures. Clearly, a free
allocation procedure does not provide this information. However, diﬀerent
auction formats also diﬀer in the information they provide.
Finally, permit auctions have the additional advantage over free allocation
procedures in that they generate public revenue. This means of raising reve-
nue is generally less harmful to economic activity than taxes on proﬁts, which
lead to so-called deadweight losses (cf. e.g. Ballard et al. 1985 or Feldstein
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other taxes (such as existing taxes on proﬁt or labour) and the distortions
induced by them (Goulder 1995). Alternatively, auction revenues can be used
to ﬁnance government investments that yield other payoﬀs (e.g. research to
improve health) or to reduce the debt burden. However, as Hahn (2009) has
pointed out, there is little evidence to suggest that auction revenues are in fact
used in the described ways. It is more likely that they will be earmarked to
encourage related eﬀorts, such as further reducing emissions or for compen-
sation measures. The Australian government proposes in the White Paper
that the auction revenue be used to compensate industry and households for
the impact of the scheme and to ﬁnance information and structural adjust-
ment provisions.
In cases where the revenue-raising objective conﬂicts with allocative
eﬃciency and price discovery, the White Paper clearly indicates that the two
latter objectives should be given priority over revenue.
5. Auction design
In this section, the characteristics of the auction format adopted in the White
Paper are described in more detail.
5.1 The ascending clock auction
An ascending clock auction resembles an English auction. In contrast to the
open-outcry format often used by auction houses, however, in the ascending
clock variant, it is solely the auctioneer who controls the pace of the auction.
Over several rounds, he announces a current price, which he increases from
round to round and bidders indicate their willingness to acquire the item at
this price. Once a bidder declines the oﬀer in a particular round, she must
withdraw and cannot re-enter the auction again in a later round. In a single-
item application, the auction stops as soon as only one bidder remains and
the price to pay is the price of either the last or the second-to-last round.
In a multi-unit extension, prior to the start of the auction, the auctioneer
determines and announces the total available quantity (supply s) and a
reserve price p0. He then opens the auction (t = 0) by inviting all bidders
i =1 ,2 ,…, n to each submit a bid di(p0) that speciﬁes the quantity of units
they wish to acquire (demand) at the reserve price. If the total demand is not
larger than the total supply (i.e.
P
i di(p0) £ s), the auction ends. All bidders
receive the units they requested and have to pay the reserve price for each unit
obtained. Any remaining supply is not sold.
If the total demand exceeds total supply, the auctioneer increases the price
and opens a new round t := t + 1 of bidding. The new price is indicated by
pt. Again, the bidders respond by submitting their demand di(pt) at this price.
This process continues as long as the total demand by all bidders exceeds the
oﬀered supply. As the announced current price pt increases from round to
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Thus, the total demand slopes downward over the course of the auction.
The auction ends once the total demand is no longer larger than the supply
being auctioned. If the total demand in the last round t* exactly equals supply
(
P
i di(pt*)=s), then the ﬁnal price p* is set to the last round’s current price
(p*: =pt*) and all bidders i receive the quantity di(pt*) they requested in their
last bid. If, alternatively, total demand in the last round t* is lower than the
supply, the ﬁnal price p* is set to the price of the second-to-last round t*)1
(p*: =pt*)1). Again, all bidders are awarded the quantity di(pt*) demanded
in their last bid. In addition, the residual supply s –
P
i di(pt*) is allocated to
the bidders in equal proportions to the residual demand with respect to the
bids di(pt*)1) in the second-to-last round. This means that a particular bidder
j receives, in addition to dj(pt*) units, an amount given by
djðpt  1Þ djðpt Þ















The recommended auction design applies a uniform pricing scheme that pro-
vides a strong signal regarding the participants’ aggregated estimates of the
true future value of a permit. One caveat is that the uniform pricing scheme
also raises the incentive for bid shading and demand reduction. In particular,
if a few large bidders dominate the market, the resulting price is likely to
understate the true marginal abatement costs. However, analysis of the Aus-
tralian electricity market conﬁrms that no participant has a market share
greater than 15 per cent.
16 As a consequence, demand reduction is expected
to have only a minor impact if at all.
15 The following example illustrates the closing and pricing rule. Assume a total supply of
100 units to be auctioned. There are two bidders, A and B. In the second-to-last round, A sub-
mits a bid of 70 units and B a bid of 40 units, and in the last round, A bids 61 and B 34. Both
bidders are awarded the quantities speciﬁed in their last bid. As these bids add up to 95 units,
there is a residual supply of 5 units. Based on the bids of the second-to-last round, A has a
residual demand of 70)61 = 9 units and B a residual demand of 40)34 = 6 units, so the total
residual demand is 15. Thus, 5/15 = 1/3 of the residual demand is served, with A receiving a
total of 61 + 9/3 = 64 units and B a total of 34 + 6/3 = 36 units. In the event that one unit
would need to be split, this unit would be randomly allocated to one of the two bidders.
16 Of the 57 electricity generating companies in Australia, the ﬁve highest emitting compa-
nies account for approximately 50 per cent of emissions and the 10 largest account for 81 per
cent. The Herﬁndahl-Hirschmann-Index (HHI) of the electricity generating market, which
measures market concentration, was found to be 0.075. A HHI index of 0.075 is considered to
be low, and thus indicative of an un-concentrated market (Evans and Peck 2007).
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In principle, an ascending clock auction provides several options for informa-
tion revelation.
After each round, the auctioneer could:
• indicate only whether total demand exceeds supply and whether an addi-
tional round of bidding will be conducted; or
• publish the total demand that has been submitted; or
• publish the number of active bidders; or
• reveal every individual bid.
Publishing the total demand at the end of each round improves transpar-
ency and increases the information available to participants. This informa-
tion reﬂects the aggregated (reported) demand curve and relates to the
economy’s abatement cost curve. Even if bidders shade their bids and the
reported demand understates the marginal abatement costs, the total demand
still provides valuable information regarding the scarcity of permits.
A contrary argument is that when the total demand is revealed, partici-
pants are in a better position to estimate the ﬁnal price of the auction before
it actually closes. This guides bidders regarding optimal bid shading and may
result in more heavily shaded bids and stronger demand reduction.
On balance, we believe that revealing the total demand at the end of each
round will result in better outcomes.
17 This information will help bidders to
reﬁne their future bids. We also consider it likely that the multiple-round
ascending clock design performs as well or better than a static uniform-price
auction in which bidders face greater uncertainty vis-a ` -vis the future market
price of an AEU.
Similarly, one could argue that publishing all individual bids at the end of
each auction round might be even more beneﬁcial for both the bidders and
the auctioneer. This alternative, however, is not recommended for the follow-
ing reasons:
• The potential value of this revelation is rather weak (what can actually be
deduced from knowing that a speciﬁc bidder drops out at a certain
price?);
• It adds unnecessary complexity to the mechanism; the number of bidders
will be large and the auction will be conducted in a relatively short time
frame
18; and
17 In fact, if the aggregated demand were not revealed at the end of the auction, the auction
would be equivalent to a sealed-bid uniform-price auction. The advantages of the open proce-
dure would then vanish.
18 If all individual bids were revealed, the information ﬂow would be tremendous and it is
unlikely that bidders would be able to extract valuable information from individual bids in
such brief time intervals. Moreover, small bidders who cannot invest in excessive bidding sup-
port systems might be disadvantaged.
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in low revenues and poor eﬃciency.
The White Paper proposes that the aggregated demand be revealed at the
end of each round. It does not specify whether individual bids will be pub-
lished.
5.4 Proxy bidding
Even though a clock auction can be conducted in a single day with just a
handful of rounds, a small bidder may prefer to submit a single demand curve
to be used throughout the auction rather than participate in each individual
round. Similarly, a bidder might not want to closely follow the auction at all
times, but be allowed to be absent for some of the time without disadvantage.
For this reason, it is recommended that the auction allow and support tools
for proxy bidding.
In an ascending clock auction, a proxy bid is a demand curve speciﬁed by
the bidder and submitted to the system. The system then automatically bids
on behalf of the bidder according to her proxy bid. Thus, bidders can treat
the auction as a uniform-price sealed-bid auction not making use of the infor-
mation published in each round.
5.5 Intra-round bidding
A desirable option is to augment clock auctions with intra-round bidding
(Ausubel and Cramton 2004). This is an alternative approach to resolving
residual demand when the auction fails to clear the market perfectly. With
intra-round bidding, the likelihood of bidders overshooting the market clear-


















Figure 1 Aggregate demand with intra-round bids (P. Cramton, presentation at CEEM
Expert Workshop on Auctioning, 2007).
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mit their demand schedules indicating the desired quantity for every price
between the previous and current round. Thus, if demand falls short of sup-
ply as the clock ticks from the second-to-last to the ﬁnal round, the auction-
eer will aggregate the inter-round bids to ﬁnd the price at which supply
exactly equals demand (Figure 1).
By using this mechanism, the market therefore clears perfectly at the mar-
ket-clearing price and there is no need for rationing residual demand among
the winning bidders.
Intra-round bidding can therefore be considered a tool with which to
smooth the clearing process. It has the advantage of minimising the impor-
tance of rationing (tie-breaking) and it enhances auction eﬃciency. Intra-
round bids may even increase revenue. Moreover, intra-round bids allow the
auctioneer to use larger bid increments and thereby speed up the auction pro-
cess. The potential downside of the latter option is that larger bid increments
reduce the number of auction rounds and thus reveal less information to the
bidders.
Intra-round bidding is used in the majority of high-stake clock auctions.
Bidders ﬁnd the approach easy to understand, and its implementation is sim-
ple for the auctioneer (Ausubel and Cramton 2004). Moreover, while bidders
can take advantage of intra-round bidding, they are not required to do so.
However, intra-round bidding is not explicitly mentioned in the CPRS White
Paper for the Australian auctions.
5.6 Auctioning diﬀerent vintages
The White Paper supports auctions of future vintages because they create
early price signals. This means that the permits of one vintage are auctioned
in several charges at diﬀerent points of time – some of them several years
ahead of the respective vintage. To reduce the number of auctions diﬀerent
vintages will be auctioned at the same auction event.
As emissions permits of consecutive vintages are close substitutes, the auc-
tion system should allow bidders to switch among the diﬀerent vintages. A
sequence of individual auctions, for example, does not support this feature
and will not ensure that similar items sell for similar prices.
Instead, simultaneous auctions have proven very successful in such sit-
uations (cf. e.g. Cramton 1997). Simultaneous auctions allow bidders to
shift demand from one item (vintage) to another as long as the auction
runs, and the auction will close only if there is no longer activity on
any item. These simultaneous formats became famous in the FCC spec-
trum auctions, but have been used in many diﬀerent – often very large-
scale – contexts ever since. Thus, simultaneous ascending clock auctions
have been recommended for auctioning several vintages in the context of
the Australian CPRS.
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Some permits will be awarded to companies of the EITE sector which may
not be directly liable under the scheme and therefore have a private
valuation of zero for the AEUs. Thus, if the free allocations are known
before an auction starts, there could feasibly be both net buyers and net sell-
ers. Net buyers are those companies that have a residual demand and wish
to acquire additional AEUs in the auction. Some EITE companies will
probably be net sellers.
19
If only the government sells permits in an auction, only those compa-
nies which have relatively high abatement costs have an incentive to
participate in the auction; net sellers like some EITE companies are not
expected to participate. The companies that will participate in the
auction therefore represent a biased sample of all companies involved in
the CPRS. If bidders do not take this issue appropriately into account,
the auction will be more competitive than the later secondary market,
leading its closing price to overestimate the future development of the
market price: the resulting allocation may be ineﬃcient (Benz and
Ehrhart 2007).
20
In order to accommodate the net sellers of EITE companies, it is
appropriate to extend the auction format in a way that allows compa-
nies which already possess emissions permits to sell these permits in the
auction. The auction then takes on the characteristics of a double auc-
tion. This adds some complexity, but the double auction format is likely
to result in a more eﬃcient outcome, especially in early years when the
secondary market may not be liquid. Transaction costs for net sellers
will be low compared to the secondary market. As a consequence of a
less biased sample of participants, the auction will generate more reliable
price signals than its one-sided counterpart. Finally, in the event that
the sellers can specify a supply curve, the non-vertical supply curve
would also reduce the incentives for demand reduction. Overall, extend-
ing the auctions to a double or two-sided format is expected to increase
eﬃciency.
19 Aluminium smelters, for example, will receive free permits for their electricity use, which
constitutes indirect emissions, and the permits for those emissions will be surrendered by the
electricity producer that is selling the electricity to the aluminium smelter. As the aluminium
smelter only has to surrender permits for its direct emissions, which are relatively low, they are
likely to receive more permits than they will need. This means that some aluminium companies
(the ones that do not have other installations with a net buying position) will be net sellers.
This will most likely be foreign companies that only own aluminium smelters and no plants in
other emission-intensive sectors in Australia, such as Norsk Hydro.
20 However, this experimental study assumed that only companies regulated under the
scheme can participate in the auction. In reality, the CPRS does not limit the participation to
regulated companies. Speculators as well as investors may participate and will increase the
competitiveness in the auction, thus reducing the risk of collusion.
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In order to generate early price signals, the ﬁrst auction needs to take place
before the start of the scheme. In addition to current vintage auctions, so-
called future vintage auctions are foreseen as part of the scheme because they
will set early price signals for the future and ensure that permits are in circula-
tion before the compliance year for which they are valid. This gives a greater
certainty to investors interested in investing in infrastructure with longer lead
times and long life-times. Buying permits at the advance auction will only
cause holding costs for the capital that is bound and cannot be used else-
where.
To set a price signal for the future, it is not necessary to auction permits for
each future vintage. Rather, it seems suﬃcient to auction only individual vin-
tages, which was done under the US Acid Rain program (Montero and Eller-
mann 1998). Furthermore, it might not be eﬃcient to auction vintages far into
the future, because companies most likely cannot accurately predict what their
abatement costs will be in the distant future, i.e. many years before actual
abatement is set to occur. Therefore, advance auctions should be oriented on
the timing of investment decisions for abatement measures. Such measures
generally have a lead time of up to 3 years before they become eﬀective.
Advance auctions should be run a maximum of 3 years in advance in order to
allow progressively more accurate information to become available.
21
Together with the decisions regarding the timing and auctioning of vin-
tages, the frequency of auctions should also be assessed. A discussion of
advantages and disadvantages of more or less frequent auctions can be found
in Neuhoﬀ (2007).
On balance, auctions held during the ﬁscal year have advantages over
yearly auctions. Correspondingly, the White Paper foresees monthly auc-
tions.
22 As vintages are auctioned 3 years in advance and there is one auction
in the reconciliation period, 16 auctions of one vintage will take place, and in
each auction 1/16th of the auctioning share of a vintage will be auctioned. At
some auction events, simultaneous spot and advance auctions will be con-
ducted (up to ﬁve simultaneous clocks at the same auction event are foreseen
in the White Paper: one for the previous vintage, one for the current vintage,
and three for future vintages) in order to increase eﬃciency and reduce trans-
action costs. Concentrating the advance auctions in one annual auction will
reduce costs because companies will not need to elaborate bidding strategies
for these somewhat more complex auction forms for each auction event.
Thus, the multiple vintage auction events will become more important com-
pared to the other auctions and might draw more attention by the companies’
managements.
21 Such time frames are also common on the electricity market. Power generators typically
engage into forward contract for selling electricity up to 3 years in advance.
22 The Evans & Peck (2007) report argues in favour of quarterly auctions, assuming a lower
auction share.
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Table 1 summarises the auction design elements and explains how each of the
recommended features contributes to achieve the Australian government
auction goals set out in Section 4. As the table shows, the strength of the pro-
posed auction design is that it complies with the requirements of the Austra-
lian government. In particular, the beneﬁt of an open clock auction seems
important for price discovery in Australia, as liquid secondary markets might
not exist at the beginning of the scheme. However, compared to the simple
single-vintage sealed-bid auction format used in other schemes, the proposed
design is rather complex. Also, the multi-clock setting could potentially lead
to shifts of demand from one clock to another. If all bidders simply place
their entire demand on the cheapest vintage, only one clock will tick forward
in each round, which would signiﬁcantly slow down the speed of the auction.
This issue, however, can easily be addressed by an appropriate incrementing
rule or restrictions on shifts of demand.
But this trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and complexity has been addressed by
the proposal by giving bidders a choice: Those who want a simple sealed-bid
auction can opt for proxy bidding, while those wanting to use the additional
information after each round can choose the clock option.
6. Interaction of primary and secondary markets
‘Why bother with auctions at all?’ is a valid question. In principle, the govern-
ment could sell the permits on the secondary market instead.
23 In fact, such
an approach was chosen in the EU ETS by for example Denmark in the ﬁrst
phase (Fazekas 2008) and by Germany from 2008 to 2010 (Deutscher Bun-
destag 2007, Article 21). The answer to this question depends on the liquidity,
timing and maturity of the market as well as the quantities of permits to be
sold.
A secondary market must exist before items can eﬀectively be traded on it.
If liquidity is very low, so that only the permits sold by the government are
being traded, there would be no diﬀerence between a primary auction and a
secondary market. Since in Europe a more or less liquid market for CO2 per-
mits existed in the phases mentioned above and both Denmark and Germany
only sold small portions of their permits, these sales did not have a signiﬁcant
eﬀect on the market. In Australia, however, liquid emissions permits markets
do not yet exist.
An argument against holding frequent auctions is that doing so would
reduce the liquidity of the secondary market (Diekmann and Schleich 2006;
Neuhoﬀ 2007). This may well be the case, particularly if large volumes are
auctioned. On the other hand, the more eﬃcient the initial allocation is, the
23 An analysis of auctioning versus selling on the secondary market was undertaken for the
UK government (Cook et al. 2005).
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the allocation right in the ﬁrst place rather than delegate this task to the sec-
ondary market?
Furthermore, the main goal of the auctions is to discover marginal abate-
ment costs. The earlier the cost information is revealed, the more valuable it
is. This again calls for auctions whose timing can be explicitly set such that
they provide for some initial allocation that will then stimulate secondary
markets for ﬁne-tuning. A stimulating eﬀect has been observed by Neuhoﬀ
(2007). Based on their observations of the US T-Bond auctions, they found
that secondary market activity increased when auctions were held. In addi-
tion, one can envisage that speculators and investors will be buying permits
at the auctions in order to sell them on the secondary market. Thus, the
eﬀects of auctions on the performance of the secondary market are not as
clear-cut as is often assumed.
7. Conclusions
Based on the policy framework and theoretical as well as experimental ﬁnd-
ings in the literature, an ascending clock auction format with the following
characteristics was proposed by the authors and later proposed by the Aus-
tralian government in their White Paper (Commonwealth of Australia 2008):
• iterative sealed-bidding in multiple rounds;
• uniform pricing;
• aggregate demand revealed in each round;
• simultaneous auctions of diﬀerent vintages whenever applicable;
• allowing EITEIs and other recipients of free permits to sell these permits
in the auction (double auction extension) and;
• proxy bids to accommodate small participants.
A remaining challenge with respect to the proposed design lies in the com-
plexity of bidding in multi-clock auctions. Given the trade-oﬀ between com-
plexity and eﬃciency when running simultaneous clock auctions and the
limited experience with this particular auction approach, laboratory experi-
ments should be performed prior to conducting the auction(s). They would
not only help to identify potential problems with the design but could also
serve to test the exact rules for the auction software.
Finally, the Australian auction proposal is unique in providing all of these
diﬀerent options and functions (e.g. double-sided, proxy bidding). If it proves
to be feasible and eﬃcient, it may be used as a prototype for other countries
introducing emissions trading schemes.
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